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Abstract  
A wide range of policy instruments have been devised and applied to support the goals 
of sustainable forestry management.  Community forestry programs can contain 
elements of several of these instruments.  This paper considers the design of community 
forestry contracts in Indonesia.  In the research site, community forestry contracts are 
contracts between the Forestry Department and community groups that provide group 
members with time-bound leasehold rights to protection forests, provided that farmers 
abide by specified land-use restrictions and pay any required fees.  Farmers perceive that 
the contracts represent a bundle of restrictions and instruments, some of which are 
explicitly stated in the contract and others that are implied by the contract. Conjoint 
analysis was used to quantify farmers’ tradeoffs among the explicit and implicit 
attributes of the contracts.  The results of bivariate and ordered logit models show that 
farmers are most concerned about the length of the contract, and surprisingly 
unconcerned about requirements on tree density and species composition.  An implicit 
attribute, greater access to forestry and agroforestry extension, emerged as an important 
implicit attribute.  The results imply that farmers in this part of Indonesia would be 
willing to abide by fairly strict limitations on land use, provided that they can be assured 
of long-term rights to the planted trees. 
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Community forestry programs, community forestry contracts, conjoint analysis, 
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1. Introduction 
Tropical forested landscapes are prototypical multi-value resources.  Different portfolios 
of private, collective and public goods and services are produced by those landscapes: 
products of interest to a range of local and external stakeholders.  Research conducted 
across the humid tropics shows that there are almost always tradeoffs between the 
extremes of intense production and complete conservation of tropical forested 
landscapes.  Between the extremes there is considerable scope for achieving outcomes of 
mutual benefit for different stakeholder groups (Tomich et al. 2005).    
 
A wide array of policy instruments has been devised for promoting the management of 
tropical forest landscapes.  These include “traditional” instruments such as state forest 
ownership, timber harvest concessions, public tree planting programs and restrictions on 
commercial trade of forest products.  They also include a variety of community and co-
management tenure arrangements, decentralization to local government authorities, 
agroforestry extension, conservation trust funds, product certification, and conditional 
payments for water quality preservation or carbon sequestration (Cubbage, Harou and 
Sills 2007 p.839; Swallow et al. 2007).   
 
In any particular context, governments and other organizations interested in the 
management of forest landscapes need to make informed choices about which 
instruments to apply.  Cubbage, Harou and Sills (2007) propose that the choice of 
instruments should be guided by benefit-cost analysis, with gaps between private and 
social returns defining the need for particular policy instruments.  An alternative 
approach is to design the policy instrument to balance the interests and perceptions of 
key stakeholder groups.  In this paper we show that conjoint analysis can be a powerful 
tool for understanding the way that farmers perceive the attributes of community 
forestry contracts in Indonesia.  Results from the study can smoothen the processes of 
negotiation between farmers and other key stakeholders in community forestry.   
Depending upon the context, a similar study could also be done with representatives of 
other stakeholders or other communities in order to identify areas of similarity and 
difference in preferences (e.g. Tsalikis, Seaton and Tomaras 2002).   
 
Forest landscape management in Indonesia is an instructive case of multiple values, 
multiple interests, and multiple policy instruments.  After many decades of top-down 
regulation and central government ownership of large tracts of land, Indonesia’s forest 
policy began in 1998 to slowly evolve toward decentralization, forestry extension, and 
stronger ownership rights for communities and indigenous peoples.  Although the   8
central government Forest Department continues to exert overall control over a large 
portion of the Indonesian land mass, some progress has been made in opening the space 
for negotiation between communities and the government (Fay, Sirait and Kusworo 
2000).  Community forestry contracts (HKm) provide one possible avenue for 
negotiated settlements of mutual benefit for government and community interests.      
 
This paper addresses the challenge of understanding farmer perceptions of community 
forestry contracts in Indonesia.  The paper focuses on a case study in the Sumber Jaya 
watershed in Lampung Province on the island of Sumatra.  The contract can be 
conceived as a bundle of policy instruments, some of which are explicitly stated in the 
contract and others implicitly implied by the contract.  This study applies conjoint 
analysis to understand the way that farmers value and tradeoff the different policy 
instruments – expressed as different attributes of a possible contract.  The results, many 
of which were unexpected, have important implications for community forestry 
contracts in Lampung province, and potentially other community forestry contexts in 
the developing world.   
2. Background 
2.1 Forest Policy in Indonesia 
Indonesia inherited its approach to forestry law from the Dutch colonial government.  
In that view, forests are viewed as strategic assets that a government should protect and 
manage in order to generate income and secure environmental services of general public 
benefit.  Government agencies in charge of the forests generate income from the sale of 
timber concessions, but do not yield ownership rights to individual forest owners or 
communities.  This approach to foreset law was institutionalized over a twenty-year 
period, beginning with the Forest Act of 1967.  Based on the Forest Act of 1967, the 
Ministry of Forests asserted control of more than 70 percent of the total area of the 
country, despite the fact that those areas were home for as many as 90 million people.  
The Ministry of Forests classified the forest estate into conservation forests, production 
forests and protection forests, with little or no recognition of the ownership rights of the 
local residents, many of whom were indigenous people who had lived in the areas for 
generations (Fay and Michon 2005, Colchester et al. 2005). 
 
International development agencies began to press for reforms of the Forest Law in 
1989, achieving modest changes through the 1990s.  In 1995 the Minister for Forests 
issued a decree that allowed farmers to apply for permits to harvest non-timber forest 
products from state forest lands.  Another Ministerial decree was issued in 1998 that   9
permitted customary communities to have their lands designated as Special Purpose 
Areas (KDTI).   
 
The fall of President Suharto in 1998 ushered in the era of Reformasi and the hope for 
much greater recognition of the rights of indigenous people and local communities.  A 
new Forestry Act was passed in 1999 that included provisions for areas of forest domain 
to be designated as Special Purpose Areas and customary forests.  Neither of these 
designations provided for community ownership of forest land, but rather were 
articulated as temporary leases or permits.  The legal provisions and implementation 
arrangements for the Forest Act have periodically changed since 1999.  The 
Government passed laws on regional autonomy in 1999 (Law 12/1999) and 2004 
(32/2004) which granted local governments more authority over natural resource 
management (Colchester et al. 2005).     
 
In 2001, the Minister of Forestry issued decree 31/2001, which provided operational 
guidelines for community forestry contracts, Hutan Kemasyarakatan (HKm).  Farmer 
groups interested in securing HKm contracts are required to form recognized farmers’ 
organizations and to follow management guidelines that local forestry officials approve 
as being protective of the watershed functions of the landscape.  Five-year initial 
contracts can be extended to a maximum of 25 years.  As of 2005, the area under HKm 
permits comprises 2100 square kilometers, less than 0.2% of the forest estate of the 
country (Colchester et al. 2005). 
 
As defined by the Indonesia forestry law, therefore, HKm permits are community 
forestry contracts in which the Indonesia government grants limited duration rights to 
forest estate land provided that the communities abide by management requirements.  
Van Noordwijk et al. (2007) regard the HKm contracts in protection forest areas to be a 
type of reward for the provision of environmental services, which can be evaluated by 
the extent to which they are realistic, conditional, voluntary and propoor (Van 
Noodwijk et al. 2007). 
2.2  Study site 
The conjoint analysis study was conducted in the Way Besay sub-watershed in the sub-
district of Sumber Jaya in West Lampung, Indonesia.  As of the mid-1990s the Sumber 
Jaya area was known as an area of intense land-use conflicts.  Between 1980 and 1990, 
the area was demarcated into a small area of private farm land, conservation forests for 
biodiversity conservation, and large areas of protection forests for watershed protection 
(Verbist et al. 2005).  Although much of the protection forests had been deforested and 
converted to coffee farms as early as the 1950s, government officials periodically evicted   10
thousands of farmers who had settled in the area, with large evictions in 1990-1, 1995 
and 1996.  Government agencies were concerned about the impacts of coffee farms on 
the quality and quantity of water in the tributaries of the Way Besay River.  A run-of-
river hydro-power plant was built on the Way Besay River to increase energy supplies to 
southern Sumatra and surrounding areas.  The state-owned power company used 
military power to remove people from the protected forest.  As of the mid-1990s, there 
had been no serious attempt to resolve the land-use conflict through dialog or 
negotiation.  The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and several local non-
governmental organizations became active in the area in 1998.   
 
At the time of this study, Sumber Jaya was part of the new district of West Lampung.  
In the year 2000, Sumber Jaya was divided into two subdistricts: Sumber Jaya to the 
east, covering 15 villages, and Way Tenong to the west, covering 14 villages.  The new 
Sumber Jaya subdistrict has an area of 356 square kilometers and is home to about 
50,000 people.   
 
Forest cover and agroforestry are both very dynamic in the Sumber Jaya area.  The 
amount of forest in the area declined from about 60% in 1970 to 32% in 1978 and to 
10% in 1990 and 2000.  Over the same period, the area covered by coffee-based 
agroforestry systems increased from about 8% in 1970 to 20% in 1978 to about 63% in 
1990 to about 70% in 2000.  Coffee is grown in three production systems in Sumber 
Jaya:  monoculture coffee, shade coffee, and multi-strata agroforests.  Shade coffee and 
multi-strata agroforests have been expanding since 1984 and now occupy about 36% of 
the study area (Verbist et al. 2005).  The rate of deforestation peaked in the 1999-2000 
period, when farmers took advantage of the fall of the Government of President Suharto 
and the relative freedom of the early days of Reformasi to expand coffee production in 
the protection forest and national park.  Despite its higher conservation status under the 
Forestry Law, the rate of deforestation has been higher in the National Park than in the 
protection forest (Ekadinata et al., no date).  Studies by Van Noordwijk et al. (2000) 
and Verbist et al. (2005) have shown that well-managed multi-strata agroforestry 
systems can be consistent with good soil management and watershed.  A study by 
Suyanto et al. (2005) shows that farmers with secure property rights are more likely to 
establish multi-strata agroforestry systems than monoculture coffee systems.         
   11
 
Figure 1.  Way Besay Sub-watershed of Sumberjaya, Sumatra Indonesia. 
 
The boundary of the Sumber Jaya subdistrict coincides with the watershed area of Way 
Besay, which also includes protected forests, including: (1) Register 39 Kota Agung 
Utara -- 500 km2 hectares; (2) Register 44B Way Tenong Kenali -- 140 km2; (3) 
Register 45B Bukit Rigis -- 83 km2; and, (4) Register 46B Palakiah – 18 km2.   Register 
45B Bukit Rigis is the most significant for watershed protection because it forms the 
headwaters of 11 rivers and streams.    
 
Since the advent of reformasi in 1998, conflict and socio-economic tension between 
coffee growers and government officers has relaxed as processes became more open and 
government agencies have shown greater interest in participatory planning and involving 
stakeholders in managing forests and conserving resources. In the year 2000, the 
government of the Province of Lampung announced provincial decree 7/2000 on local 
tax and levies on non-timber forest products, including coffee.  This arrangement has 
been seen as formally recognizing farmers who cultivate coffee in protection forests.  The 
Forestry Law of 1999 and decentralization laws of 1999 and 2004 increased the scope   12
for local forestry officials to negotiate land use agreements with local residents. Research 
organizations and non-governmental organizations working in the area have supported 
negotiations between community groups and various government agencies.   
2.3  Community forestry in the Sumber Jaya case study area 
In the Sumber Jaya area, coffee agroforests have been established in areas designated as 
private farm land and areas designated as protected state forest land.  Temporary 5-year 
Hutan Kemasyarakatan (HKm) contracts have been granted to coffee growers that form 
a farmers’ organization and meet the criteria for community-based forestry management 
according to the Decree of Ministry of Forestry Number 31/2001.  As of 2005, 28% of 
the protected forest area was under managed through HKm contracts, 56% of the area 
was in process of negotiation for HKm contracts, while the remaining 16% had no 
community forestry status.  
Some elements of the HKm contracts are explicitly stated in the contracts that have been 
offered to farmers in the Sumber Jaya area: 
 
1.  Conditional tenure security to utilize forest land for a probationary period for 
five years. If the group of HKm farmers satisfies all criteria and indicators of 
HKm requirement, the tenure could be extended to a maximum of 25 years.    
2.  Farmers obtaining HKm permits are required to grow timber trees in the 
protection forest land.  Different government programmes have required 
densities between 400 and 1000 trees per hectare.  The current HKm contracts 
in Sumber Jaya require a minimum of 400 trees per hectare.    
3.  HKm holders can continue growing coffee and accompanying shade trees as 
long as at least 30 percent of the trees are of timber species.   
4.  Farmers have no right to sell and cut the timber trees that they plant.   
5.  HKm contracts in Sumber Jaya do not require the payment of any annual fee 
from the farmers, although farmers living in neighboring regions are required to 
pay an annual fee.  
 
During open-ended interviews conducted in the preliminary stages of this research in 
Sumber Jaya, some farmer groups that had attained HKm contracts indicated that they 
had received benefits beyond the explicit elements of their contracts.  It was suggested 
that by gaining the HKm status, farmers had become more eligible for participation in 
forestry extension programs, they had more rights to have public infrastructure 
constructed in the HKm areas, and their families had more legitimate claims on public 
services provided in nearby towns.  The conjoint analysis study of farmers’ preferences 
for the attributes of community forestry contracts therefore considered both the explicit 
and implicit elements of the contracts.     13
 
2.4  Conjoint Analysis  
The main theoretical foundations of conjoint analysis are in consumer theory and its 
main applications have been in marketing.  The fundamental assumption is that the 
utility derived from a good or service is derived from the properties or attributes of the 
good or service.  In other words, overall utility for a good can be decomposed into 
separate utilities for its constituent attributes (Louviere 1994).   In conjoint studies, 
respondents choose between alternative products or scenarios that display varying levels 
of selected attributes. Appropriately structured and repeated across a sample of 
respondents, these comparative evaluations can be used to calculate the part-worth 
utilities of each attribute.  Part-worth utilities can be combined to estimate relative 
preference for any combination of attribute levels (Green and Srinivasan 1990).   
 
The term ‘conjoint analysis’ refers to an overall approach and group of quantitative 
techniques that can be used to determine respondents’ preferences for the attributes that 
make up a product or service. Key components of conjoint studies are: (1) the product 
may be defined using an aggregate of features or attributes that take certain levels or 
values, (2) different levels of the attributes define different versions of the product under 
consideration; (3) product appraisal by individuals is a function of the value which they 
assign to the product’s attributes, and (4) during the decision-making process, 
individuals appraise the worth of each combination, and their choice demonstrates 
prioritization among the different combinations of attributes. The total worth of a 
particular product is then determined by the different part-worth of each attribute level 
(Sayadi, Roa and Requena, 2005).   
 
Data for a conjoint study are generated through a survey in which respondents are asked 
to rate realistic but hypothetical products that have alternative levels of important 
attributes.  Tradeoffs among attributes can be quantified and estimates developed for the 
marginal value of specified levels of the attributes.  The survey data can also be analyzed 
to test whether there are significant differences in preferences among groups of 
respondents.   
 
For the last few decades, conjoint analysis has been increasingly applied in the field of 
resource economics for valuation of ecosystem components and for ascertaining the 
preferences of stakeholders in environmental decisions involving tradeoffs not efficiently 
represented in market transactions. Asking respondents to make choices over a set of 
alternatives mimics the real choices that managers must make, and can provide feedback   14
to stakeholders with respect to the consequences of their choices. Choice experiments 
can be designed and analyzed in many ways. Respondents may be asked to reveal their 
preferences by choosing one of two or more options, ranking several options, or 
assigning numerical ratings to each option.  
 
Conjoint analysis has also been used to support negotiations about the elements of 
contracts.  Greenhalgh and Neslin (1981) tested and verified the applicability of 
conjoint analysis for ascertaining the preferences of management, unions and employees 
in a labour contract bargaining situation.  Klosowski et al (2001) used conjoint analysis 
to assess the attitudes of U.S. farmers toward coordinated ecosystem management and 
economic policy tools for promoting ecosystem management.  The Klosowski et al 
(2001) results showed that while farmers had generally positive attitudes toward 
ecosystem management, they were likely to have muted responses to tax incentives.              
3.  Applying Conjoint Analysis for Assessing Preferences 
for the Elements of Community forestry Contracts  
In this study, conjoint analysis was used to evaluate farmers’ preferences over the explicit 
and implicit attributes of community forestry contracts in the Sumber Jaya area of 
Indonesia.  We begin with the assumption that farmers derive utility directly from the 
explicit and implicit attributes of the HKm contracts, with each attribute represented by 
a small number of levels.   
The utility derived from HKm contracts is expressed as a quasi-concave, twice 
continuously differentiable utility function (equation 1): 
Ui(Ph) = U {Zh; Xi} ……………………………………. (1)   
where:  
Ph is the h-th hypothetical package of HKm contract attributes; 
Ui(Ph) is the utility that the i-th farmer derives from the h-th HKm contract;  
Zh is a vector of levels making up the attributes of the HKm contract, Ph; 
Xi is a vector of characteristics of the i-th farmer. 
 
The corresponding indirect utility function Vi(P) has a systematic component vi(P) and 
a random unobservable component, ε, that is unique to each farmer.  The indirect 
utility for the h-th HKm contract is given by equation (2). 
 
Vi(Ph) ═ v(Ph) +  εih ………………………………………………. (2) 
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Conjoint analysis uses field experiments in which a sample of farmers are asked to give 
ratings of hypothetical packages of HKm contracts with predetermined attributes and 
levels of attributes.  A 1 to 5 scale was used for the rating, with 1 indicating least 
preferred and 5 indicating most preferred.  In addition, farmers were asked to compare 
the hypothetic contracts with existing HKm contracts.  In the same interview, farmers 
were also asked a series of questions to reveal information about their individual 
characteristics.  Characteristics such as age, education, wealth and ethnicity were 
hypothesized to affect farmers’ preferences to the different attributes of the contracts.   
4.  Study design and methods  
This section explains the methodology used in the conjoint study, including the 
attributes of the HKm contracts, study sites, sampling, field survey procedures, and 
econometric technique to process the data collected from the field.  
4.1 Design of Attributes and Levels of HKm Contracts 
A preliminary list of explicit and implicit attributes of the HKm contracts and levels of 
those attributes was developed on the basis of the existing contracts (see Table 1), 
previous studies of HKm in the area (Arifin 2006, Suyanto et al., 2005), discussions 
with key informants, and group interviews at the site.  The list of explicit attributes is 
mostly based on the Ministerial Decree No. 31/2001 that established the possibility of 
HKm contracts.  In addition, the list of attributes includes the amount of labour 
required for group activities (in addition to attending meetings) such as forest guarding, 
tree planting etc. which has been built into some HKm contracts, although such 
requirements are not explicitly mentioned in the Ministerial Decree.     
 
Implicit attributes are those that farmers in Sumber Jaya perceive to have been implied 
by the HKm contracts.  From the key informant and group interviews, we hypothesized 
that farmers associated with HKm contracts with easier access to agroforestry extension 
services, access to better roads in the HKm areas, easier access to agricultural credit, 
easier access to agricultural marketing services, and easier access to public services.   
Interviews with forestry department officials revealed that they did deliberately select the 
HKm groups for inclusion in forestry extension programmes, in part because the HKm 
group structure made it easier for them to reach large number of farmers.  Another 
government department did make major renovations on at least one road into the HKm 
area after contracts were signed.  Some key informants postulated that easier access to 
credit and marketing services could be built into the contracts to make the contracts 
more popular with farmers.    
   16
The preliminary list of attributes was discussed with groups of interested researchers at 
the site and at the University of Lampung.  A revised list of attributes and levels was 
then applied in a pre-test of the questionnaire in the study site.  The pre-test suggested 
that farmers had trouble rating scenarios with too many attributes.  The list of attributes 
and levels was further discussed by team members and at a seminar held at the offices of 
the Centre for International Forestry Research and World Agroforestry Centre in Bogor, 
Indonesia.  Generally, we removed attributes that could not be clearly expressed to 
farmers and those that farmers did not expect to be explicitly included or influenced by 
HKm contracts.  Table 1 lists the eight attributes that were ultimately included in the 
study design, including the level of that attribute as indicated in the current contract. 
 
Table 1.  Attributes of HKm Contracts 
Attribute Requirements
Explicit attribute of contract 
1. Length of main contract  25 years, after 5 year prob. 
2. Minimum density of trees per hectare  400 trees (5x5 meter 
spacing)
3. Composition of trees allowed  At least 30% of timber 
trees
4. Right to harvest and sell timber trees that you plant on HKm 
land 
No right to cut and sell
5. Fee to be paid to local government for HKm  Rp 0 per year
6. Required contribution of labor without pay for group activity 
(in addition to meeting) e.g.: forest guarding, tree planting etc 
Not specified in HKm 
contract, but indicated in 
group constitutions 
Implicit attribute of contract 
7. Easier access to agroforestry extension services and seedlings  Not specified
8. Better roads into the HKm area  Not specified
 
The levels of attributes are selected to simplistically capture the existing level and 
realistic alternative levels.  For example, levels on the length of main contract are set to 
vary from the minimum of 15 years, to the default of 25 years, and to the maximum 35 
years.  The levels on the attribute of right to harvest and sell timber are set to binary 
options: “yes” (have the right) or and “no” (don’t have the right).  Implicit attributes 
related to government programs such as access to forestry and agroforestry extension and 
access on better roads into HKm areas also have only two levels, yes or no.  Table 2 lists 
the attributes and levels included in the final conjoint survey design. 
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Table 2.  Attributes and Levels of HKm Contracts in Sumber Jaya, Indonesia 
Attribute  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Explicit attribute of contract 
1. Length of main contract  15 years  25 years 35 years
2. Required density of trees / ha  400 (5 meters) 600 (4 meters) 1000 (3 meters)
3. Composition of trees allowed  15% timber trees 
required




4. Right to cut and sell timber trees 
that you plant on HKm land 
Have right to 
sell
Don’t have right 
to sell
5. Level of fee to be paid for HKm*  Rp 0 per hectare 
per year
Rp 36,000 per 
hectare per year
Rp 72,000 per 
hectare per year
6. Required contribution of labor 
without pay for group activity 
(in addition to meeting) such as 
forest guarding, tree planting 
etc 
1 day per month  5 days per 
month
Implicit attribute of contract 
7. Easier access to agroforestry 
/forestry extension services and 
seedlings 
Yes No
8. Better roads into the HKm area  Yes No
* The average rate of exchange between the US$ and Indonesian Rupiah in 2005 was 
9500 Rupiah / 1 US$. 
4.2 Field Survey Design  
The conjoint analysis study was conducted as component of a study of the potential for 
the HKm contracts to contribute to poverty alleviation.  That broader study was 
conducted with eight strata of households in the Way Besay sub-watershed (see Figure 
2).  Strata 1 and 2 were selected to represent different levels of likely tenure security, 
including the least secure (strata 1 – farming in the national park) and the most secure 
(strata 2 – farming on private land).  Three levels of HKm permit were distinguished for 
people farming in protection forest land:  having an HKm permit (strata 3 and 4), 
having an HKm permit in process (strata 5 and 6) and having no HKm rights (strata 7 
and 8).  Each of these three groups was further distinguished by whether or not they had 
experienced evictions in the 1990s.  Table 3 lists the full set of household strata and 
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of the 8 strata.        
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Table 3:  Strata of households included in the study of poverty alleviation impacts of HKm 
Strata 
number 
Characteristics of households 
1  Living in the Bukit Barison Selatan National Park  
2  Cultivating own private land 
3  Having a HKm permit, and experiencing eviction in the 1990s 
4  Having a HKm permit, and no experience with eviction 
5  Having HKm in the process of approval, and experiencing eviction 
in the 1990s 
6  Having HKm in the process of approval, and no eviction experience 
7  Having no HKm rights, and experiencing eviction in the 1990s 
8  Having no HKm rights, and no eviction experience 
 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of Sample in Way Besay Sub-Watershed, in Sumberjaya. 
This study of preferences for the attributes of community forestry contracts was 
conducted with households with some experience of the HKm contracts.  For these 
purposes, strata 3 and 4 were combined into a stratum of households with HKm 
permits, while strata 5 and 6 were combined into a stratum of households who had 
applied for HKm permits, but not yet received the permits. 
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The sampling and interview methods were jointly designed to efficiently cover the range 
of contract design options described in Table 2.  There are four attributes with three 
levels (length of contract, required tree density, composition of trees allowed, fee) and 4 
attributes with 2 levels (right to cut and sell timber trees, required labour contribution, 
access to agroforestry / forestry extension services, access to improved roads).  The total 
number of scenarios for the 8 attributes is 24 * 34 = 1296.  From pre-tests of the conjoint 
analysis method, we determined that 12 was an appropriate number of scenarios to ask 
each respondent to rate.  We therefore ascertained that 108 respondents could handle 
the full set of scenarios, meaning that each respondent responded to a unique set of 12 
scenarios (12 scenarios x 108 respondents = 1296 scenarios).  Our sampling procedure 
therefore was to randomly select 108 respondents from the stratum of households who 
had HKm permits and 108 respondents from the stratum of households who had 
applied for HKm permits.  Each respondent was asked to compare 12 scenarios, selected 
to give a near orthogonal design.  A total of 216 interviews were therefore conducted.  
 
The questionnaires were written in Bahasa Indonesia in order to ease the process of data 
collection and improve communication between enumerators and respondents. From 
the results of previous surveys conducted in the area, we understood that all respondents 
would be literate, with most having completed elementary school.  An introduction of 
about 30 minutes was given by the enumerator to each respondent before the 
respondent was asked to provide ratings and preferences on the package of HKm 
contracts. The attributes and levels were summarized in the questionnaire in a simple 
table that could be easily understood by the respondents. As explained above, each 
respondent was asked to rate 12 scenarios or hypothetical contracts.  Respondents were 
asked to providing ratings of between 1 and 5 for each hypothetical contract, with 1 
representing a low desirability and 5 representing high desirability, as well as an 
indication of whether or not they preferred the hypothetical contract over the current 
contract.  Respondents were also asked to provide information about household 
characteristics that we hypothesized to have important affects on preferences.  These 
included age of household head, family size, ethnicity, years of education of the 
household head, knowledge of HKm, previous access to technical assistance, and 
whether the HKm contract had already been granted or was still being processed. 
4.3  Bivariate Logit Analysis 
Two statistical analyses was undertaken to evaluate farmers’ preferences over the levels 
and attributes of the contracts.  First, a bivariate logit analysis was undertaken to assess 
how the levels of the attributes affected whether they preferred the hypothetical contract 
over the current contract.   
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Expanding equation (2) from above for our case, we obtain equation (3):    
Vi(Ph)* = bl Z1h + … b8 Z8h + c1 X1 + … + cjXj +  εih   ………………(3)   
Where:  Vi(Ph)* is an unobserved measure of the utility that farmer i derives from the 
attributes of the h-th HKm contract 
Z1h … Z8h
  is a vector of levels of the observed attributes of the HKm contract  
X1 … Xj is a vector of the respondent’s characteristics  
b1 … b8  and c1 … cj are unknown parameters 
εih is a random error term.  
 
While Vi(Ph)* cannot be observed, the binary choice experiment provides information 
about whether the farmer prefers or does not prefer the hypothetical contract to the 
existing contract.  The rational farmer will choose the existing contract if the utility he 
or she expects to derive from the existing contract is equal to or greater than the utility 
he or she would expect to derive from the hypothetical contract.  In other words:    
 
BCi=0 if Vi*(P0) ≥ Vi*(Ph) ……………… (4) 
BCi=1 if Vi*(P0) < Vi*(Ph) 
 
Where: BCi=0 if farmer i prefers the existing contract and BCi=1 if farmer i prefers the 
hypothetical alternative contract (BC represents binary choice).   
 
Pr (BCi=1) = Pr (Ui*(Ph) > Ui*(P0)  ………………(5) 
= Pr [(εi0 – εih) < (β l Z1h +…+ β 8 Z8h + c1 X1 +…+ cjXj)  - (β l Z10 +…+ β 8 Z80 + c1 X1 + … 
+ cjXj )] 
 
ZX is the vector of attributes of the HKm contracts and respondent characteristics 
β is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
 
Assuming that the εs are independently and identically distributed, the appropriate 
functional form of (εi0 – εih) defines the appropriate estimation technique for estimating 
the utility difference (equation 5).  Here we assume that (εi0 – εih) is distributed according 
to the logistic function, making bivariate logit the most appropriate estimation 
technique.  An advantage of the logit technique is that the parameter estimates are easily 
interpreted as the logarithm of the odds ratios.  An odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of 
an event occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in another group.  For a 
given attribute, an odds ratio of one implies that the attribute has no effect on the odds 
that respondents will prefer the hypothetical contract to an existing contract.  An odds 
ratio less than one indicate that higher levels of the attribute reduce the odds that   21
respondents prefer the hypothetical contract to the existing contract.  An odds ratio 
greater than one implies that higher levels of the attribute increase the odds that 
respondents will prefer the hypothetical contract compared to the existing contract. 
4.4 Ordered logit analysis 
Another statistical procedure was appropriate for the analysis of the ratings data.  The 
dependent variable is the rating between 1 (least preferred) and 5 (most preferred), while 
the independent variables are the levels of the 8 attributes and the characteristics of the 
respondents.  We assume that any contract that the farmer rates with a higher number is 
preferred over any contract that he or she rates with a lower number, but do not assume 
that the intervals between the ratings are equal.  For example, we cannot assume that the 
difference in preference between ratings 1 and 2 is the same as the difference in 
preference between ratings 4 and 5.  The ratings therefore are characterized as discrete 
and ordered, but not ordered by equal interval.  Again assuming that the error terms are 
distributed over the logistic function, ordered logit is an appropriate analytical approach 
for this analysis (Greene 1993).   
 
As for the bivariate logit, the starting point for the ordered logit model is equation (3) 
above, where the indirect utility that is derived from an HKm contract is a function of 
the attributes of the contract and the respondent’s characteristics.  While the indirect 
utility derived from a particular contract cannot be observed, we observe the ratings 
(Rating) of between 1 to 5, where: 
Rating = 1 if Ph* ≤ μ1 
Rating = 2 if μ1 < Ph* < μ2 
Rating = 3 if  μ2 < Ph* < μ3 
Rating = 4 if  μ3 < Ph* < μ4 
Rating = 5 if Ph* ≥ μ4 
 
Where μ1 … μ4 are estimated cutoff points.   
The probability that the farmer will give a rating of j to the h-th HKm contract is given 
as: 
Phj = Prob (Rating = j) = Prob μj-1 < Г ZX + eih < μj ……. (6a) 
 =  L (μj - (Г ZX)) - L (μj-1 - (Г ZX)) …. (6b) 
Where: Г is a vector of parameters to be estimated using a maximum likelihood  
estimator 
ZX is the vector of attributes of the HKm contracts and respondent 
characteristics   22
L is the cumulative logistic density function. 
 
5. Results   
This section presents the research results, including descriptive statistics about the 
respondents and econometric analysis on the attributes of HKm contracts.   
5.1 Respondent Characteristics 
The average respondent of this survey was 43.7 years for households with HKm permits 
and 42.6 years for households with HKm permits in process.  Respondents with the 
HKm permits had an average of 6.5 years of formal education, while those with the 
HKm in process had an average 5.9 years of education.  Average family sizes were 
generally small, 4.0 in households with HKm permits and 3.6 in households with HKm 
permits in process.   
The major ethnic groups of respondents with HKm permits were Javenese (45 percent) 
and Sundanese (43 percent), while those with HKm permits in process were Javanese 
(43 percent) and Sundanese (34 percent). The majority of respondents were migrants 
from Java or children of migrants.  In digneous Lampun gese were a min ority.  The 
demographic characteristics of respondents are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Table 4.  Demographic Characteristics of Respondents  
HKm Permit  HKm Process  Important Variables 
Mean Std.dev Mean  Std.dev 
1. Age (years)  43.7  0.4  42.6  0.3 
2. Education (years)  6.5  0.1  5.9  0.1 
3. Household size (number)  3.6  1.3  4.0  1.5 
4. Ethnic Group          
     - Javanese (%)  45.4  4.8  42.6  4.8 
     - Sundanese (%)  42.6  4.8  34.3  4.6 
     - Lampungese (%)  12.0  3.2  23.2  4.1 
5.  Migration Status         
     - From Java  35.2  4.6  38.0  4.7 
     - From other districts in Lampung  19.4  3.8  17.6  3.7 
     - From other places in the country  8.3  2.7  7.4  2.5 
6.  Permanent migrant status (%)  98.2  1.3  99.1  0.9 
7.  Second generation migrant (%)  34.3  4.6  33.3  4.6 
8.  Third generation migrant (%)  2.8  1.6  3.7  1.8 
Source: Calculated from field survey 
Additional characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 5.  A large majority 
of the respondents listed agriculture as their primary occupation.  The total value of the   23
assets owned or controlled by the households was Rp 57.5 million for households with 
HKm permits and 61.5 million for households with permits in process.  This includes 
the value of their house, land parcels, animals, and transportation equipment.   
Respondents in households with HKm permits were generally aware of the permits (84 
percent), while awareness was lower among households with permits in process (48 
percent).  Access to formal credit was similar with the two groups, while access to 
extension services was higher for households with HKm contracts (84 percent) 
compared to households with permits in process (59 percent). These differences in 
awareness of HKm and access to extension were the only notable differences between the 
two groups. 
 
Table 5.  Social-Economic Characteristics of Respondents 
HKM Permit  HKm Process  Important Variables 
Mean St.dev Mean  St.dev 
Agriculture as primary occupation (%)  97.2  1.0  97.2  1.6 
Total asset owned (Rp million) *  57.5  2.0  61.5  2.3 
Awareness of HKm tenure (%)  84.3  3.5  48.2  4.8 
Access on technical assistance (%)  81.4  3.8  59.3  4.8 
Access on formal credits (%)  39.8  4.7  38.9  4.7 
* The average rate of exchange between the US$ and Indonesian Rupiah in 2005 was 
9500 Rupiah / 1 US$. 
Source: Calculated from field survey 
5.2 Preferences for hypothetical contracts compared to existing 
contracts 
Table 6 presents the results of the bivariate logit analysis on preferences for hypothetical 
contracts compared to the existing HKm contracts.  As shown in equation (5), the 
explanatory variables include the contract attributes and characteristics of the respondent 
households.  In addition, we considered four variables that represent the interactions 
between contract attributes and household characteristics.  That is, we hypothesized:  (1) 
that preferences over length of contract would be affected by the household’s HKm 
status; (2) that preferences over the HKm fee would be affected by their assets; (3) that 
preferences over the need to contribute to group activities would be affected by family 
size; and (4) that preferences over tree density requirements would be affected by 
previous access to technical assistance.   
 
The results for the explicit attributes are generally consistent with expectation, with all 
attributes having statistically significant effects on preferences except for tree 
composition and labour contributions to collective activities.  The odds ratios shown in   24
the rightmost column show that contracts that require higher tree density, higher fruit 
tree percentages, and impose higher fees would all be less preferred than the terms of the 
existing contract (those with odds ratios less than 1).  Length of contract has a very large 
impact on the odds of a farmer preferring the hypothetical contract over the existing 
contract:  a contract valid for 25 years would be 2.7 times more likely to be chosen than 
a contract valid for 15 years, while a contract valid for 35 years would be 9.2 times more 
likely to be chosen than a contract valid for 15 years.  A contract that allowed farmers to 
harvest timber trees would be 2.2 times more likely to be chosen than a contract that did 
not allow harvesting of timber trees. 
 
The two implicit attributes – better access to extension services and access to better roads 
in the HKm area -- have significant effects on preferences.  Contracts that provided 
better access to forestry and agroforestry extension services would be 2.4 times more 
likely to be selected than contracts that did not provide such access, while contracts that 
provided better roads in HKm areas would be 1.5 times more likely to be selected than 
contracts that did not provide that acess.  Even though the existing contracts do not 
explicitly indicate that members of HKm groups will obtain better access on extension 
services and seedlings, the norms found in the study site are that government extension 
providers have given priority to HKm groups.     
 
Respondent characteristics have little effect on preferences.  Age of household head, 
ethnicity, household assets, and years of education all had insignificant effects on 
preferences.  Perhaps most surprising was that there were no significant differences in 
preferences between respondents who belonged to groups with HKm contracts and 
respondents who belonged to groups with HKm contracts in progress.  Instead, the 
results indicate that respondents who were not aware of the HKm contracts had 
somewhat lower preferences for the hypothetical contracts than respondents who were 
aware of the HKm contracts. They had odds of 0.29 of preferring the hypothetical 
contract to the actual contract.   Also respondents who had received technical assistance 
had lower preferences for the hypothetical contracts than respondents who had not 
received technical assistance.  They had odds of 0.32 of preferring the hypothetical 
contract to the actual contract. 
 
The results at the bottom of Table 6 show that two of the interaction terms had 
statistically significant effects on preferences. That is, households whose HKm contract 
was still be processed placed even greater importance on the length of contract than 
households whose HKm contracts had already been granted.  While statistically 
significant, the odds ratio was only 1.04.  Households that had access to technical   25
assistance placed even greater important on tree density than households whose HKm 
contracts had already been granted.  The odds ratio on this interaction term was only 
1.002.     
Table 6.  Bivariate Logit Results on Preferences for Hypothetical Compared to the existing HKm 
contract 
Definition  Coefficient 
(log odds 
ratio) 
z P>z  Odds 
ratio 
Constant -1.704       
Attributes of the hypothetical contract:      
• HKm period 25 years (default 15 years)  0.997  4.37  0.000  2.710 
• HKm period 35 years (default 15 years)  2.221  5.43  0.000  9.217 
•Tree density 600 trees / ha (default 400 trees / ha)  -0.655  -4.29  0.000  0.519 
• Tree density 800 trees / ha (default 400 trees / ha)  -1.047  -4.69  0.000  0.351 
• Max fruit tree composition 30% (default 15%)  -0.162  -1.34  0.180  0.850 
• Max fruit tree composition 50% (default 15%)  -0.155  -1.29  0.198  0.856 
• Tree cutting rights (default no cutting)  0.802  7.98  0.000  2.230 
• Pay fees of 36,000 Rp / year (default no fees)  -0.969  -7.57  0.000  0.379 
• Pay fees of 72,000 Rp  year (default no fees)  -1.159  -7.93  0.000  0.314 
• Contribute 5 days per month to group activities 
(default 1 day) 
-0.255 -0.91 0.363 0.775 
• Access to extension services & inputs (default no 
access) 
0.863 8.57  0.000  2.370 
• Access to roads in HKm area (default no access)  0.382  3.85  0.000  1.465 
Characteristics of respondent:      
• Age of household head  0.001  0.20  0.841  1.001 
• Ethnicity of Javanese (default, Lampung, Sumendo)  -0.031  -0.21  0.830  0.969 
• Ethnicity of Sundanese (default, Lampung, Sumendo)  0.059  0.39  0.694  1.061 
• Years of education  -0.020  -1.11  0.266  0.980 
• Aware of HKm (default no aware of HKm)  -0.024  -0.19  0.853  0.976 
• Access to technical assistance (default no access)  -1.223  -2.95  0.003  0.294 
• Assets in year 2000  0.002  1.55  0.121  1.002 
• HKm status in progress (default HKm permit already 
issued) 
-1.153 -3.15 0.003 0.315 
• Family size in 2005  -0.070  -1.12  0.264  0.932 
Interactions between attributes of contract and 
respondent characteristics: 
    
Length of contract x HKm status in process   0.040  3.00  0.003  1.041 
Fee on HKm contract x Assets in year 2000  0.000  -0.24  0.811  1.000 
Contribute to group activities x Family size in year 2005  0.015  0.88  0.379  1.015 
Tree density x access to technical assistance  0.002  2.68  0.007  1.002 
        
Pseudo R-squared  0.291       
5.3 Factors affecting farmers’ ratings of HKm contracts 
Results from the ordered logit analysis of farmer ratings of the hypothetical contracts are 
presented in Table 7.  In qualitative terms, the results of the ordered logit model are very 
similar to those generated by the bivariate logit model of farmers’ preferences of 
hypothetical contracts compared to the existing HKm contract.  The ordered logit results 
also indicate strong preferences over the length of the contract period, the required 
density of timber trees, the right to cut the timber trees, and the level of the annual fee.    26
Rules on the composition of trees and required contributions to group activities had 
insignificant effects on farmer ratings.  The two implicit attributes, access to extension 
services and roads in the HKm area, also had significant effects on preferences.  The only 
respondent characteristics that had any effect on preferences were awareness of the 
contracts and previous access to technical services, both of which reduced farmers’ ratings 
over the hypothetical contracts.  The odds ratios confirm that length of contract is by far 
the most important variable affecting preferences.  None of the interaction terms had 
significant effects on preferences.  





z P>z  Odds 
ratio 
Attributes of the hypothetical contract:     
HKm period 25 year (default 15 year)  1.437  8.36  0.000  4.208
HKm period 35 year (default 15 year)  3.239  10.68  0.000  25.508
Trees density 600 trees/ ha (default 400 trees/ha)  -0.308  -2.69  0.007  0.735
Trees density 800 trees/ ha (default 400 trees/ha)  -0.553  -3.33  0.001  0.575
Trees composition 30% (default 15%)  -0.136  -1.49  0.136  0.873
Trees composition 50% (default 15%)  -0.222  -2.43  0.015  0.801
cutting rights (default no cutting)  0.609  8.07  0.000  1.839
pay fees 36000 Rp/year (default no pay fees )  -0.976  -10.00  0.000  0.377
pay fees 72000 Rp/year (default no pay fees )  -1.397  -12.38  0.000  0.247
contribute to activities group 5 day (default 1 day)  -0.285  -1.33  0.182  0.752
access to extension service and input (default no access)  0.922  12.04  0.000  2.514
access to roads in HKm area (default no access to roads)  0.496  6.59  0.000  1.642
Characteristics of respondent:     
age of HH  -0.002  -0.56  0.572  0.998
ethnic of Javanese (default lampung,sumendo ethnic)  0.144  1.33  0.183  1.155
ethnic of sundanese (default lampung,sumendo ethnic)  0.151  1.32  0.185  1.163
Education -0.0153  -1.12  0.263  0.985
aware of HKm (default not aware of HKm)  0.169  1.76  0.078  1.184
access to technical assistance (default no access)  -0.271  -0.87  0.384  0.763
assets in 2000  0.002  1.81  0.070  1.002
HKm status in Process (default HKm permit)  -0.270  -1.08  0.281  0.763
family size in 2005  -0.068  -1.41  0.158  0.934
Interactions between attributes of contract and 
respondent characteristics:     
Interaction HKm status in Process and length of contract of 
HKm  0.009 0.95  0.344 
 
1.009
Interaction assets in 2000 and Fee on HKm contract  0.000  -1.18  0.238  1.000
Interaction family size in 2005 and contribute to activities 
group 0.015  1.15  0.249 
 
1.015
Interaction access to technical assistance and trees density  0.000  0.29  0.776  1.000
Cut-off points between the ranks:            
cut1  -1.910         
cut2 1.159       
cut3 2.799       
cut4 4.695       
Pseudo R2  0.197           27
6. Discussion  and  Conclusions   
This conjoint analysis study of farmers’ preferences for the attributes of community 
forestry contracts in the Sumber Jaya watershed in Lampung Province applied bivariate  
logit to analyze farmers’ comparisons of hypothetical contracts with existing contracts 
and ordered logit to analyze farmers’ ratings over hypothetical contracts.  Results from 
the two analyses were remarkably similar, suggesting that we can be very confident in 
the validity of the findings.  This study therefore indicates that the conjoint analysis 
methods can be effective in the Indonesia context.  In Indonesia and elsewhere in the 
developing world, conjoint analysis can be effective in eliciting farmers’ preferences over 
the attributes of community forestry contracts.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
application of conjoint analysis to elicit farmers’ preferences for the attributes of 
community forestry contracts.  Results such as those generated in this study can be used 
to support conflict resolution and negotiation between farmers and foresters.  
 
Results from both the bivariate logit and ordered logit indicate that the length of the 
HKm contract is the attribute of greatest concern to farmers in the Sumber Jaya area.  
The results suggest that farmers in this area would be willing to accept contracts with 
many land use and tree planting restrictions, provided that they have certainty that they 
and their families will be able to stay on the land for a relatively long period.  There are 
two likely reasons why land tenure security emerged as so important in this study.  First, 
most of the survey respondents identify themselves as first or second generation migrants 
to the area; as migrants they are less able to claim customary rights and are particularly 
interested in being able to benefit from long-term investments in the area.  Second, the 
Sumber Jaya area has a history of conflict over farmers’ use of the protection forests for 
coffee production (Verbist et al. 2005). 
 
The survey participants also responded very favourably to hypothetical contracts that 
gave them the right to harvest timber from their HKm plots.  The existing rules and 
regulations on HKm do not allow any farmer to cut the timber in the state forests, 
except for some domestic or non-commercial uses.  The Forest Department should 
carefully consider the implications of allowing farmers to harvest timber for commercial 
use on some of protected forest land.  Results from the previous studies by Verbist et al. 
(2005) and Suyanto et al. (2005) suggest that farmers in the area are increasingly 
adopting multi-strata agroforestry systems and that land tenure security prompts greater 
investment in the multi-strata systems.  Having the right to harvest timber might further 
strengthen these investment incentives.      
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The results also suggest that farmers are very concerned about the presence and level of 
any fee levied on the HKm contracts.  This result was surprising for two reasons.  First, 
preliminary interviews suggested that farmers might prefer to pay a fee for their 
contracts so that they would have clearer evidence of government endorsement of those 
contracts.  Second, the fees of Rp 36.000 or Rp 72.000 appear to be very low ($US 4-8) 
compared to the potential returns that the farmers can earn from growing coffee in the 
HKm plots.  A study in the same area by Arifin (2006) suggests that farmers feel that 
they have paid enough retribution and fees during the earlier stages of obtaining the 
HKm permit.  Farmers also may feel that the imposition of a fee reduces their tenure 
security, giving them a status more akin to annual renting than long-term leasing. 
 
An approximate analysis (results not shown) suggested that farmers concern about 
length of contract and rights to cut trees were the most variable between individuals in 
the sample. This variability between individuals could not be attributed to any of the 
social characteristics considered. 
 
This study went beyond consideration of the explicit attributes of the community 
forestry contracts to also consider two implicit attributes that farmers seemed to 
associate with the HKm contracts.  The descriptive results confirmed that farmers with 
HKm contracts were more likely to get access to forestry and agroforestry extension.  
Results from the conjoint analysis showed that farmers would indeed place higher value 
on contracts that ensured them better access to extension.  As long as the norm is for 
farmers to associate better access to forestry extension with the HKm contracts, the 
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